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Maintaining Capital in the Secondary Mortgage 
Market: Housing Finance Reform and the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In an opening statement regarding new liquidity, risk 
management, and capital standards for banks, Federal Reserve Board 
(the “Board”) Governor Daniel K. Tarullo said, “[t]he most important 
contribution we can make to the global financial system is to ensure the 
stability of the U.S. financial system.”1 This statement reflects the 
widespread and lasting effects of the 2008 financial crisis. Moreover, 
Tarullo was merely echoing the central mandate of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd- 
Frank”).2 
One of the enhanced prudential standards mandated by section 
165 of Dodd-Frank is the newly approved minimum liquidity coverage 
ratio (“LCR”) which is intended to ensure the short-term stability of 
financial  institutions during times of strained liquidity.3  To comply  
with the LCR, financial institutions will be required to maintain 
sufficient liquidity to withstand forecasted net cash outflows over a 
thirty-day period during a stressed economic scenario.4 Whether a 
financial institution has sufficient liquidity for purposes of the LCR is 
determined by the institution’s aggregate holdings of certain asset 
classes defined in the rule as High-Quality Liquid Assets (“HQLA”).5 
 
 
1. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening 
Statement at Federal Reserve Board Meeting (Feb. 18, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20140218a-tarullo- 
statement.htm). 
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (declaring that the purpose of the Act is “[t]o 
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system”). 
3. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 
61440 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329). 
4. Id.  For a full discussion of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, see infra Part II. 
5. Id. 
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This new rule and its definition of HQLA may have serious unintended 
consequences for housing finance reform efforts currently underway in 
Congress.6 
This Note argues that the recently adopted LCR rule must be 
accounted for in any housing finance reform bill passed by Congress, 
and may potentially require a rewrite of certain aspects of the rule in 
order to prevent serious harm to the primary and secondary mortgage 
markets, banks, and the U.S. economy.7 This Note focuses on the 
wisdom of excluding certain asset classes, namely private label 
mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”) and collateralized mortgage 
obligations (“CMOs”),8  from the LCR rule’s definition of HQLA.9 
The rule’s HQLA definitions are critical to the LCR calculation 
and may dramatically affect the assets financial institutions choose to 
hold on their balance sheets in order to comply with the LCR 
requirement.10 Should Congress eventually pass housing finance reform 
legislation, these investment decisions may be even more limited than 
 
6. See infra Part V. 
7. This Note will not address the policy behind instituting a liquidity coverage ratio. 
For the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that such regulation is necessary to ensure 
the adequate short-term liquidity of financial institutions. For a discussion on this topic, see 
Andrew W. Hartlage, Note,  The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio and Financial Stability, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 453 (2012) (discussing shortcomings of the LCR as a means of 
regulating liquidity), and Adam R. Lewis, Note, North Carolina  Community  Banks: 
Survival Strategies for Turbulent Times, 17 N.C. BANKING INST. 333, 343–44 (2013) 
(critiquing the LCR’s disproportionately negative impact on smaller community banks). 
8. MBS generally break down into two categories: CMOs and mortgage pass-through 
securities (otherwise known as participation certificates). CMOs are backed by a pool of 
mortgage loans and/or pass-through securities and divided into multiple tranches with 
varying characteristics such as principal and interest payments, maturity dates, and payment 
priority among tranches. In contrast, pass-through securities entitle each holder to a pro rata 
share of the principal and interest payments made on the pooled mortgage loans. Mortgage- 
Backed Securities, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last updated July 23, 2010). 
9. The final LCR rule refers generally to MBS as “[a] security issued by, or 
guaranteed as to the timely payment of principal and interest” and does not explicitly 
mention either CMOs or pass-through securities. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk 
Measurement  Standards, 79 Fed. Reg.  61440, 61529  (Oct.  10, 2014) (to be codified  at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329). Therefore, given that both are MBS, this Note assumes that the 
language in the final LCR rule referring to MBS includes both CMOs and pass-through 
securities. Industry analysts are unsure how CMOs will be treated, but Credit Suisse  
analysts believe they will count as HQLA. Jody Shenn, Banks Left Guessing If Mortgage 
Bonds Liquid Under Rules, 103 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 476, 476 (Sept. 5, 2014). 
10. See, e.g., Comment Letter from David H. Stevens, President and Chief Exec. 
Officer, Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, to the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Aug. 5, 2014), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=TREAS- 
DO-2014-0005. 
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intended by the final LCR rule.11 The housing finance reform bills 
currently being considered by Congress would wind down the Federal 
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”).12 These government 
sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”)13 are currently the primary issuers of 
MBS.14 GSE-issued MBS are designated as HQLA and included in the 
LCR calculation.15 However, private label MBS fall outside the rule’s 
definition of HQLA.16 Therefore, proposed housing finance reform 
legislation that would eliminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might 
unintentionally eliminate MBS, as a whole, from inclusion in the LCR 
calculation.17 
Without future GSE securitizations, the LCR rule will 
discourage financial institutions from holding MBS in their liquidity 
portfolios if the only MBS available do not count towards regulatory 
compliance.18 Such a shift in the allocation of capital away from 
mortgage securities has the potential to dramatically impact the housing 
finance market by drying up funds currently available for mortgage 
origination.19 
 
11. See infra Part IV.B. 
12. Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th 
Cong. § 101 (2014); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R. 
2767, 113th Cong. § 103 (2013); Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014, 
H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. § 305 (2014). 
13. The term “GSE” refers to the Farm Credit System and the Federal Home Loan  
Bank (“FHLB”) System in addition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 61457 n.41. 
14. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, U.S. MORTGAGE-RELATED SECURITIES ISSUANCE 
AND OUTSTANDING (Jan. 5, 2015), available at http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx 
(showing that GSE MBS accounted for $1.2 trillion out of $1.3 trillion in total MBS issued 
in 2014). 
15. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61529. 
16.    Id. at 61464–65. 
17. Two of the three legislative proposals currently before Congress would replace 
GSE MBS with either a new MBS issuing entity or an enhanced Ginne Mae. The question  
is whether or to what extent these new MBS would qualify as HQLA.  See infra Part IV.A. 
18. See Comment Letter from Christopher B. Killian, Managing Director, Head of 
Securitization, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, to the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Aug. 8, 
2014), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketBrowser;rpp=25;po=0;dct=PS;D=TREAS-DO-2014- 
0005 (stating that the LCR may decrease liquidity in the secondary mortgage market by 
providing a disincentive to hold private label MBS). 
19. See MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, COST OF HOUSING 
FINANCE REFORM 5 (Nov. 2013), available at https://www.economy.com/mark- 
zandi/documents/2013-11-20-Cost-of-Housing-Finance-Reform.pdf      (“[I]nvestors,    who 
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This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses the purpose 
and calculation of the newly finalized LCR rule and the financial 
institutions to which it applies (“covered companies”).20 Part III lays a 
quantitative foundation necessary to understand the broader economic 
implications of the LCR.21 Part IV discusses current legislative 
proposals to reform the housing finance market and the potentially 
dangerous interplay between this legislation and the LCR.22  Finally, 
Part V offers two alternatives for ameliorating the potential unintended 
consequences of the LCR on housing finance reform.23 
II. FINALIZED LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO 
 
 
A. Background and Purpose of the LCR 
 
The LCR aims to improve the liquidity of large financial 
institutions.24 Specifically, the LCR purports to strengthen the financial 
stability of covered financial institutions by reducing their liquidity risk 
profile in conformity with the enhanced prudential standards mandated 
by section 165 of Dodd-Frank.25 On October 24, 2013, the  Board 
adopted a proposed rule establishing the LCR.26 The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and the Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (“OCC”) (collectively with the Board, the “Agencies”) 
followed  closely  in  proposing  a  “substantially  identical”  rule.27  The 
 
currently are willing buyers of government-backed mortgage securities, would be unable to 
purchase mortgage securities in a fully privatized system.”); see also DOUGLAS HOLTZ- 
EAKIN ET AL., AM. ACTION FORUM, REGULATORY REFORM AND HOUSING FINANCE: PUTTING 
THE        “COST”      BACK        IN        BENEFIT-COST        (Oct.      25,      2012),      available   at 
http://americanactionforum.org/research/regulatory-reform-and-housing-finance-putting- 
the-cost-back-in-benefit-cost (estimating the probable effect of Basel III capital standards 
and the Qualified Mortgage provisions of Dodd-Frank on mortgage credit availability and 
the broader housing market). 
20. See infra Part II. 
21. See infra Part III. 
22. See infra Part IV. 
23. See infra Part V. 
24. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 
61440 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329). 
25. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board 
Proposes Rule to Strengthen Liquidity Positions of Large Financial Institutions (Oct. 24, 
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131024a.htm. 
26. Id. 
27. J. PAUL FORRESTER & JASON H.P. KRAVITT, MAYER BROWN LLP, THE US BANKING 
  
 
 
2015] HOUSING FINANCE REFORM AND THE LCR 57 
Agencies jointly issued a notice of proposed rulemaking on November 
29, 2013, with a public comment period open until January 31, 2014.28 
After considering the comments received during the public comment 
period, the Agencies approved a final rule for the LCR on September 3, 
2014.29 
The final LCR rule is based on the international Basel III LCR 
standard promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision.30 While the final LCR generally adheres to the Basel III 
LCR, it diverges in several material provisions discussed more fully 
below.31  Tarullo described the proposed LCR as a “super-equivalent”   
to the Basel III LCR because it contains stricter provisions than those of 
the Basel III LCR.32 Any departure from the international standard may 
significantly affect the regulatory burden, operating costs, and 
competitive advantage or disadvantage of financial institutions relative 
to financial institutions in countries that adopt the Basel III  LCR.33    For 
 
REGULATORS PROPOSE A LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO FOR LARGE BANKING ORGANIZATIONS 
AND     SYSTEMICALLY     IMPORTANT    NON-BANKS    1    (Nov.    1,    2013),    available    at 
http://www.mayerbrown.com/files/Publication/912e2974-db38-43d4-909d- 
853b68099fdb/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ed9dcc6e-208c-42aa-9233- 
873568123b66/UPDATE-Liquidity_Coverage_Ratio_Large_Banking_Orgs_1013.pdf. 
28. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards,  and 
Monitoring, 78 Fed. Reg. 71818 (proposed Nov. 29, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
249). 
29. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Banking 
Regulators Finalize Liquidity Coverage Ratio (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20140903a.htm. 
30. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61440. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY 
COVERAGE RATIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS (Jan. 2013), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf; About the Basel Committee, BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/about.htm (last updated June 20, 2014) 
(“The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for the prudential regulation of 
banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters.”). 
31. See infra Part II.C. 
32. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening 
Statement at Federal Reserve Board Meeting (Oct. 24, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20131024a.htm). 
33. A country that adopts stricter provisions than called for in the Basel III LCR rule 
risks hampering the competitiveness of its financial institutions. See DONALD N. LAMSON ET 
AL., SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, BASEL III FRAMEWORK: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO (US 
IMPLEMENTATION) 4 (Sept. 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2014/09/DoddFrank— 
Liquidity-Coverage-Ratio-Rule-Finalized-FIA-and-FR-092914.pdf (stating that the EU has 
already adopted LCR rules that are consistent with the Basel III LCR and less stringent than 
the final U.S. LCR). In adopting the final LCR rule, the Agencies acknowledged this 
criticism, but ultimately decided to modify the Basel III LCR “to reflect the unique 
characteristics and risks of the U.S. market and U.S. regulatory frameworks.”   Liquidity 
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these reasons, the ways in which the final LCR rule deviates from the 
Basel III standards are of great importance to U.S. financial institutions. 
The 2008 financial crisis was in large part a liquidity crisis occurring  
within  a  highly  interconnected   financial  industry.34 The 
inadequate liquidity risk management at financial institutions prior to 
the financial crisis contributed to the spread of the crisis and inhibited 
the ability of financial institutions to weather the evaporation of short- 
term credit.35 Poor  liquidity  risk  management  prior  to the financial 
crisis resulted in merger, federal bailout, and outright  failure  for  many 
financial institutions.36 
The LCR attempts to remedy the liquidity shortcomings that 
existed prior to the financial crisis.37 To that end, the LCR encourages 
less reliance on short-term funding that may become unavailable during 
a liquidity freeze and lower concentration of “asset classes that have a 
significant liquidity discount if sold during a period of stress.”38 Further 
clarification on asset classes the LCR encourages financial institutions  
to hold, and how the LCR discourages reliance on short-term wholesale 
funding are discussed below.39 
In addition to remedying liquidity shortcomings, the LCR also 
serves an important informational purpose. The final LCR intends to 
provide greater detail to financial institutions, regulators, creditors, 
debtors, and investors about the short-term liquidity position of a 
financial   institution.40 More    information    about  how   financial 
institutions’ liquidity profiles vary over time and, in particular, during 
adverse economic scenarios will facilitate more prudent management 
and  supervision  of  their  liquidity  risk  and  funding  needs.41       This 
 
Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 61445. 
34. See Robert E. Lucas, Jr. & Nancy L. Stokey, Liquidity Crises: Understanding 
Sources and Limiting Consequences: A Theoretical Framework 6, 8–9 (Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis, Economic Policy Paper 11-3, May 2011), available at 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4661& (arguing 
that the failures of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 2008 were the result of investment 
bank runs that sparked contagion effects throughout the financial industry). 
35. See LAMSON ET AL., supra note 33, at 4. 
36. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61448. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See infra Part II.B. 
40. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61445. 
41. Id. 
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additional data also enables both management and regulators to “take 
appropriate actions to address liquidity needs; and, in situations of 
failure, implement an orderly resolution of the covered company.”42 
 
B. Scope of the LCR and Calculation Under the Final Rule 
 
The LCR targets “large and internationally active banking 
organizations.”43   The final rule, however, also contains a provision for  
a modified minimum LCR (“Modified LCR”) that applies to financial 
institutions that are not internationally active and do not have significant 
insurance or commercial activities.44 The Modified LCR imposes a 
relatively lighter regulatory burden than the full LCR,45 so it is  
important to understand what companies are covered by the LCR as 
opposed to the Modified LCR.46 
1. Covered Companies and Covered Depository Institution Subsidiaries 
Financial  institutions  that  qualify  as  covered  companies   are 
subject to the LCR “because of their complexity, funding profiles, and 
potential  risk to the financial  system.”47     Covered companies  include: 
(1) financial institutions with total consolidated assets greater than or 
equal to $250 billion; (2) financial institutions with total consolidated 
on-balance sheet foreign exposure greater than or equal to $10 billion; 
(3) depository subsidiaries of the companies described under (1) and (2) 
with $10 billion or more of total consolidated assets; and (4) financial 
institutions that any of the Agencies deem appropriate based on the 
institution’s “asset size, level of complexity, risk profile, scope of 
operations, affiliation with foreign or domestic covered entities, or risk 
to the financial system.”48 
The scope of the rule encompasses bank holding companies and 
savings and loan holding companies with total consolidated assets of 
 
42.   Id. 
43.    Id. at 61440. 
44. Id. 
45. See id. at 61521. Implementation of the Modified LCR does not begin until Jan. 1, 
2016, one year later than the LCR. Id. Calculation of net outflows is also modified so as to 
decrease the denominator of the Modified LCR. Id. 
46. See infra Part II.B.1. 
47.    Id. at 61440. 
48.    Id. at 61524. 
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$50 billion or more even if they do not meet the above requirements.49 
They fall under the Modified LCR, however, which has less stringent 
requirements.50 These Modified LCR holding companies do not escape 
the LCR because the Agencies still view them as “large financial 
companies with extensive operations in banking, brokerage, and other 
financial activities” although less complex than the “covered 
companies” subject to the full LCR.51 The final rule specifically  
excludes community banks from the LCR or Modified LCR 
requirements.52 
The comment period resulted in a notable change to the final 
rule by excluding nonbank financial companies from the scope of the 
rule,53 even those designated by the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council (“FSOC”) as systemically important financial institutions 
(“SIFI”).54 This provides only a temporary reprieve for these SIFIs, as 
the Agencies intend to tailor the LCR to include them, either 
individually, or within the category of nonbank financial companies, 
taking into account “the business model, capital structure and risk 
profile” of designated companies.55 
 
2.  Definition of HQLA 
 
Before  the  LCR  calculation  can  be  explained,  its constituent 
 
 
49.    Id. at 61540. 
50. Id.; see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 
29. 
51. Liquidity Coverage Ratio:  Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61522. The Modified LCR does not apply to certain grandfathered unitary savings and loan 
holding companies and bank holding companies or savings and loan holding companies that 
engage in insurance underwriting operations or significant activities that are not financial in 
nature. 
52.    Id. at 61440. 
53.    Id. at 61446. 
54. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) §  
113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012) (granting the FSOC authority to designate nonbank financial 
company a SIFI subject to Board Supervision and Dodd-Frank prudential standards); see J. 
PAUL FORRESTER ET AL., MAYER BROWN LLP, US BANKING REGULATORS ADOPT FINAL 
RULE TO IMPOSE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO ON LARGE US BANKING INSTITUTIONS 1 (Sept. 
5, 2014), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/US-Banking-Regulators-Adopt-Final- 
Rule-to-Impose-Liquidity-Coverage-Ratio-on-Large-US-Banking-Institutions-09-05-2014/ 
(noting the exclusion of nonbank systemically important financial institutions or SIFIs from 
the final rule). 
55. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61446; see also FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54. 
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parts must first be introduced in greater detail. The LCR is a ratio with  
a numerator equal to the total amount of a financial institution’s HQLA 
and the denominator equal to the net cash outflows from the financial 
institution over a thirty-day period under stressed economic conditions 
defined by the Agencies.56 
The LCR rule, approved by the Agencies, provides specific 
examples of assets that qualify for inclusion in the numerator as HQLA 
as well as criteria for determining whether an asset qualifies as HQLA.57 
The LCR rule divides HQLA into three asset classes: Level 1, Level  
2A, and Level 2B.58 Level 1 assets consist of cash, U.S. Treasury and 
government agency securities, and certain other sovereign debt and 
development bank securities.59 Level 2A assets represent a riskier asset 
class than Level 1 assets and include securities issued by the GSEs and 
certain sovereign debt and development bank securities not classified as 
Level 1.60 Level 2B assets are comprised of certain investment grade 
corporate debt and certain publicly traded common equity shares.61 
Whether an asset is a Level 1, Level 2A, or Level 2B determines 
if the financial institution must apply a discount—commonly referred to 
as a “haircut”—to the value of that asset when calculating HQLA.62 
Furthermore, these levels determine whether that asset is capped at a 
certain percentage of the financial institution’s liquidity portfolio.63 The 
Level 1 category represents the safest and most liquid assets and, 
therefore, no haircut or portfolio restrictions apply.64 Level 2A assets 
receive a 15% haircut and Level 2B assets receive a 50% haircut in  
order to compensate for the greater level of risk associated with those 
assets.65 Furthermore, Level 2 assets combined cannot account for 
greater than 40% of a financial institution’s HQLA, and Level 2B assets 
 
56. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61528–29. 
57. Id. at 61529–31; see also id. at 61526 (defining “liquid and readily-marketable”). 
58.    Id. at 61529. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. In general, Level 2B corporate debt must be investment grade, liquid and 
readily marketable, and not issued by a financial sector company. Id. Level 2B common 
equity shares must similarly be liquid and readily marketable, not issued by a financial 
sector company, as well as traded on the Russell 1000 index. Id. 
62.    Id. at 61459. 
63.   Id. 
64.    Id. at 61530. 
65.   Id. 
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alone cannot exceed 15% of an institution’s HQLA in order to 
“prevent[] concentrations of less liquid assets and ensure[] a sufficient 
stock of the most liquid assets to meet stressed outflows during a period 
of significant market distress.”66 
An asset’s classification is significant because it ultimately 
determines whether the full amount of the asset will count towards 
HQLA or whether its value will be reduced by a haircut. Other things 
being equal, a Level 1 asset not subject to a haircut provides more value 
to a financial institution than a Level 2 asset for the purposes of meeting 
the institution’s required amount of HQLA necessary to  comply with 
the LCR.67 Likewise, an asset that is subject to a haircut,  but 
nonetheless counts towards HQLA, is relatively more valuable to a 
financial institution in terms of complying with the LCR than an asset 
that falls outside the HQLA definition.68 The LCR rule’s definition of 
HQLA plainly contains an incentive for financial institutions to choose 
to hold assets that have been “blessed” by the Agencies. 
 
3.  Net Outflows Calculation 
 
The denominator of the LCR equation represents the net flow of 
funds out of the financial institution during a hypothetical thirty-day 
period of economic stress.69 Total projected outflows—contractual 
payments, maturities, and estimated runoff in funding sources70—are 
subtracted from the total projected inflows for the thirty-day period.71 
The total projected inflows amount cannot be greater than 75% of the 
total projected outflows72 in order to prevent financial institutions from 
 
66.    Id. at 61459. 
67. See id. at 61530 (detailing the calculation of the adjusted liquid asset amounts due 
to the haircuts applicable to Level 2A and 2B assets). 
68. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES ADOPT 
FINAL LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO REGULATIONS 3 (Sept. 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/memos/memo_9_24_2014.pdf (“[S]ome 
categories of assets, such as non-investment-grade corporate debt securities and private label 
residential mortgage-backed securities, will have no value for purposes of U.S. liquidity 
requirements.”). 
69. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61444. 
70. See id. at 61532–36 (defining assumptions for outflow rates of various funding 
sources reflecting standardized stressed assumptions). 
71. See id. at 61536–37 (listing assumptions for inflow rates of various sources of 
funds also reflecting standardized stressed assumptions). 
72.    Id. at 61531. 
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becoming “overly reliant on inflows, which may not materialize in a 
period of stress.”73 Added to the amount of net outflows is  the  
difference between the highest cumulative outflow during the thirty-day 
period and the final net cumulative outflow on day thirty.74 This 
additional calculation is intended to identify liquidity pressures within 
the thirty-day period that may not be apparent from the net outflow 
amount.75 
 
4.  Calculation of the LCR 
 
The fully phased-in LCR will require covered financial 
institutions to hold an amount of HQLA on their balance sheets equal to 
their total projected net cash outflows in a stressed scenario as detailed 
above.76 Essentially, covered financial institutions should have an 
amount of HQLA at least equal to the amount of cash the institution can 
expect to leave the company over the thirty-day stress period.77 Stated 
another way, HQLA over net outflows should equal at least one.78 In 
theory, a ratio of at least one should provide an adequate amount of 
creditworthy and easily-monetized assets to allow the financial 
institution to meet its obligations as they come due during a short-term 
crisis.79 
 
C. Differences Between the Finalized LCR and the Basel III LCR 
 
The finalized LCR rule is based on the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision’s Basel III LCR.80 While the version of the LCR 
adopted  by the  Agencies generally parallels the  Basel  III international 
 
73.    Id. at 61444. 
74. LAMSON ET AL., supra note 33, at 2 (referencing the portion of the final rule to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 249.30(b)). 
75. Id. (noting that this calculation goes beyond the Basel III standard). 
76. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61528–29, 61531. 
77. Id. 
78. FORRESTER & KRAVITT, supra note 27, at 2. 
79.    Id. at 1–2. 
80. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29; see also 
Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Opening Statement 
at Federal Reserve Board Meeting (Sept. 3, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/tarullo-statement-20140903.htm) 
(adopting final LCR rule). 
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standard,81 it contains an accelerated implementation timeline and 
qualifies fewer assets as HQLA.82 By approving an LCR rule that 
materially diverges from the international standard, the Agencies 
increased the regulatory burden and operating costs of U.S. financial 
institutions, thereby inhibiting their competitiveness with international 
financial institutions.83 Adopting an LCR more in line with the 
international standard would arguably achieve the liquidity goals of the 
LCR with fewer unintended consequences.84 
The Basel III standard requires each covered financial  
institution to be 60% compliant with the LCR by January 1, 2015, with 
10% annual increases until attaining 100% compliance by January 1, 
2019.85 In contrast, the U.S. LCR requires a much more aggressive 
phase-in. Financial institutions were required to be 80% compliant by 
January 1, 2015, with 10% annual increases until fully compliant by 
January 1, 2017.86 The Agencies stated “[t]he accelerated transition 
period reflects a desire to maintain the improved liquidity positions that 
U.S. institutions have established since the financial crisis, in part as a 
result of supervisory oversight by U.S. bank regulators.”87 On the other 
hand, industry commenters view the accelerated implementation as a 
competitive disadvantage for U.S. global banks relative to foreign bank 
competitors, as well as for U.S. regional banks that are less able to bear 
the additional compliance costs relative to their larger competitors.88 
 
 
81. See BASEL COMM., supra note 30. 
82. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29. 
83. See Jaymin Berg & Bill Warlick, Stricter U.S Bank Liquidity Rules to Affect 
Profitability, FITCH RATINGS FITCH WIRE (Oct. 25, 2013), 
https://www.fitchratings.com/gws/en/fitchwire/fitchwirearticle/Stricter-U.S- 
Bank?pr_id=806151 (explaining that the exclusion of assets that qualify as HQLA under the 
Basel III standard, such as private label MBS, covered bonds, and municipal securities from 
the definition of HQLA in the United States, will negatively affect bank profitability). 
84. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61450. For example, one commenter cautioned that an LCR stricter than the Basel III LCR 
“could lead to distortions in the market, such as dramatically increased demand for limited 
supplies of asset classes and hoarding of HQLA by financial institutions.” Id. 
85. See BASEL COMM., supra note 30, ¶ 10. 
86. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61538. 
87. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 29. 
88. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Michael P. Smith, President & Chief Exec. Officer 
of the New York Bankers Ass’n, to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC (Jan. 31, 2014), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R- 
1466&doc_ver=1 (“[T]he LCR requirements will interact with many of the laws and 
regulations enacted in the last five years relating to capital, leverage and other prudential 
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The U.S. LCR also differs materially from the Basel III LCR in 
its definition of asset classes that qualify as HQLA. While the U.S.  
LCR excludes high-quality private label MBS, municipal debt,89 and 
asset-backed securities, the Basel III LCR includes them as HQLA.90 
Several industry commenters noted that such treatment of these assets 
could result in higher funding costs and scarce capital for these 
secondary markets.91 The U.S. LCR definition of HQLA entirely 
excludes private label MBS, whereas GSE MBS are classified as Level 
2A assets.92 The disparate treatment  of these  two classes of MBS will 
be discussed in greater detail below, particularly the potential effect this 
dichotomy will have if a housing finance reform bill passes Congress.93 
The final LCR rule adopted by the Agencies contains clear 
incentives for covered financial institutions.94 The  LCR  gives 
preference to Level 1 assets such as U.S. Treasuries over Level 2 assets 
such as investment grade corporate debt and GSE MBS.95 Similarly, 
common equity is preferred over investment grade private label MBS 
and municipal bonds.96   Although the Agencies downplay the potential 
 
 
 
standards, in ways that may work against the goals of competitive equality, and  
transparency across markets.”); see also Comment Letter from Paul E. Burdiss, Corp. 
Treasurer of SunTrust Banks, Inc., to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC (Jan. 31, 2014), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R- 
1466&doc_ver=1 (“[T]he LCR is not only unduly burdensome for smaller regional banks to 
comply with on the proposed timeline, but it also implicitly grants a competitive advantage 
to [large global banks].”). 
89. OLIVER IRELAND & MICHAEL ONTELL, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, CLIENT ALERT: 
FINALIZED LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO (Sept. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.mofo.com/~/media/Files/ClientAlert/2014/09/140904FinalizedLiquidityCoverag 
eRatio.pdf (although municipal securities are not included in the final rule, the agencies are 
open to further consideration and inclusion of some of these securities at a later date). 
90. FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54, at 1. 
91. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul Ackerman, Exec. Vice President and 
Treasurer, Wells Fargo, to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC (Jan. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R-1466&doc_ver=1. 
92. FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54, at 1. 
93. See infra Part IV.B. 
94. See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, Regulators’ New Bank Liquidity Rule 
May Negatively Impact Financing for Businesses, Consumers (Sept. 3, 2014), 
http://fsroundtable.org/regulators-new-bank-liquidity-rule-may-negatively-impact- 
financing-businesses-consumers/. 
95. See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79  Fed. 
Reg. 61440, 61530 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329)  
(detailing the calculation of the adjusted liquid asset amounts due to the haircuts applicable 
to Level 2A and 2B assets). 
96. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 68, at 3. 
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effects of the incentives inherent in the LCR,97 financial institutions will 
seek to comply with their regulatory obligations by  shifting  capital 
away from these disfavored asset classes.98 If the Agencies were to  
adopt the more inclusive Basel III definitions of HQLA, the shift 
between assets would be less pronounced99 because more assets would 
be classified as HQLA.100 
III. SIZING THE IMPACT: QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES 
 
 
A. Quantitative Baseline to Assess Potential Impact of LCR on 
Economy 
 
In order to appreciate the LCR’s potential impact, one must first 
appreciate the size of the mortgage market, both in terms of loans and 
securitizations, as well as the structure of ownership. As of September 
30, 2014, there was $13.4 trillion in total U.S. mortgage debt 
outstanding, $9.9 trillion of which was residential.101 That amount 
represents the mortgages on approximately 34 million homes.102   Of that 
$13.3 trillion in mortgage debt, depository institutions held $4.1 trillion, 
Fannie Mae held $3.0 trillion, Freddie Mac held $1.7 trillion, the 
Government  National  Mortgage  Association  (“Ginnie  Mae”)103   held 
 
 
 
97. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61465. 
98. See Press Release, Fin. Servs. Roundtable, supra note 94, at 1. 
99. See KEVIN BUEHLER ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., BETWEEN DELUGE AND DROUGHT: 
THE      FUTURE      OF      US   BANK     LIQUIDITY AND FUNDING 18–19 (July 2013), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/risk/latest_thinking/working_papers_on_risk 
(stating that banks will shift their holdings between Level 1 and Level 2 assets in order to 
optimize profitability and compliance with the LCR). 
100. FORRESTER ET AL., supra note 54, at 1. 
101. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. (Dec. 
11, 2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm. 
102. Based on the average loan amount for all mortgage loans according to the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s Monthly Interest Rate Survey from June 2014. STATE HOUSE 
NEWS SERV., FHFA: Mortgage Interest Rates Down in June, Aug. 1, 2014. 
103. Ginnie Mae is a “wholly-owned government corporation within the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)” that issues MBS explicitly 
guaranteed by the U.S. government. Ginnie Mae’s Role in Housing Finance, GINNIE MAE, 
http://www.ginniemae.gov/consumer_education/Pages/ginnie 
_maes_role_in_housing_finance.aspx (last updated Jan. 10, 2013). 
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$1.5 trillion, and private mortgage conduits held $1.1 trillion.104 As of 
September 30, 2014, there was $7.1 trillion in outstanding U.S. Agency 
MBS ($2.8 trillion issued by Fannie Mae, $1.6 trillion issued by Freddie 
Mac, $1.5 trillion issued by Ginnie Mae) and $1.0 trillion in outstanding 
residential private label MBS.105 
Given the size of the MBS security market, it is also important  
to consider who owns all of these securities. As of December 31, 2014, 
the Federal Reserve System (the “Fed”) held over $1.7 trillion worth of 
agency MBS.106 At that same point in time, all U.S. depository 
institutions combined held $724.5 billion worth of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac MBS, $226.9 billion worth of Ginnie Mae MBS, $136.6 
billion worth of privately issued residential mortgage-backed securities, 
as well as $193.4 billion worth of GSE debt.107 In comparison, U.S. 
depository institutions only held $345.5 billion worth of U.S. Treasury 
securities.108 MBS, particularly GSE MBS, compose a significant 
portion of bank portfolios especially compared to U.S. Treasuries.109 
Since the financial crisis, the GSEs have dominated the MBS 
market in both new issuance and market share at the expense of private 
label MBS.110 Absent a meaningful change like housing finance reform, 
the shrinking market share of private label MBS will continue.111 As of 
July 31, 2014, the GSEs accounted for 99%  of MBS issuance volume 
for 2014 with private label MBS accounting for the remaining 1%.112  In 
 
104. Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 101. 
105. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, supra note 14. 
106. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL 
RELEASE: H.4.1 FACTORS AFFECTING RESERVE BALANCES (Jan. 2, 2015), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/Current/h41.pdf. 
107. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REPORT: FDIC STATISTICS ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 
(Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter FDIC STATISTICS], available at 
https://www2.fdic.gov/SDI/main.asp. 
108. Id. 
109. See Comment Letter from 14 Regional Banks to the Board, the OCC, and the FDIC 
16 (Jan. 31, 2014), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/apps/foia/ViewComments.aspx?doc_id=R-1466&doc_ver=1 
(noting that GSE MBS compose a significant portion of regional bank portfolios). 
110. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, supra note 14. 
111. See The Private Label Mortgage-Backed Securities Market: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Sen. Tim 
Johnson, Chair, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs) (discussing the current 
dearth of private capital in the mortgage market and stating that housing finance reform is 
necessary to attract private capital back to the market). 
112. Investor Presentation, FREDDIE MAC (Aug. 2014), 
http://www.freddiemac.com/investors/pdffiles/investor-presentation.pdf. 
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2013, the GSEs accounted for 98% of total MBS issuance and private 
label MBS accounted for the remaining 2%, continuing the GSEs’ 
market dominance that began in 2008 during the financial crisis.113 
Despite financial institutions’ seemingly vast current holdings of 
securities, covered companies faced at least a $200 billion shortfall of 
HQLA when the Agencies proposed the LCR rule in October 2013.114 
To comply with the LCR rule, banks will be compelled to optimize their 
liquidity portfolios by selling MBS and buying more lower-yielding 
Level 1 assets.115 By adding regulatory value, as opposed to economic 
value, to Level 1 assets, the LCR creates new incentives to hold these 
asset classes at the expense of Level 2 assets like GSE MBS or excluded 
assets like private label MBS.116 
The Fed further complicated matters by ending its most recent 
bond-buying program, known as quantitative easing (“QE”), in October 
2014.117 Beginning in 2009, the Fed expanded its balance sheet through 
three rounds of massive purchases of Treasury securities and GSE MBS 
in order to stimulate economic activity.118 During the most recent round 
(QE3), the Fed purchased $40 billion of GSE MBS per month.119 
Standing alone, the LCR incentivizes banks to hold fewer MBS, 
specifically private label MBS.120 The Fed ending its MBS purchases 
combined with sales of MBS by financial institutions in order to comply 
with the LCR creates the potential for a significant reduction in demand 
 
113. Id. 
114. PWC FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY PRACTICE, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 
REGULATORY BRIEF: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO:  ANOTHER  BRICK IN  THE WALL  3 (Oct. 
24, 2013), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial-services/regulatory- 
services/publications/assets/fs-reg-brief-dodd-frank-act-basel-iii-fed-liquidity-coverage- 
ratio.pdf. Although this data came from the Board’s October 2013 meeting, the data is still 
highly probative given the finalized rule is nearly identical to the proposed rule. 
115. See Berg & Warlick, supra note 83 (“To achieve compliance with the proposed 
LCR, Fitch believes banks would likely need to derisk their investment portfolios and move 
towards very liquid lower-yielding government and agency securities.”). 
116. Clifford Rossi, New Liquidity Rules Will Put a Drag on Mortgage Finance, AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/new-liquidity-rules- 
will-put-a-drag-on-mortgage-finance-1063544-1.html. 
117. See Jon Hilsenrath, Fed Closes Chapter on Easy Money, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 
2014, at A1. 
118. See Jeff Kearns, The Fed Eases Off: Tapering to the End of a Gigantic Stimulus, 
BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Nov. 7, 2014), 
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/federal-reserve-quantitative-easing-tape 
(discussing the Fed’s three quantitative easing programs). 
119. Hilsenrath, supra note 117. 
120. Comment Letter from Christopher B. Killian, supra note 18, at 10. 
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for MBS that may unintentionally siphon capital out of the secondary 
mortgage market. As will be discussed further below, housing finance 
reform bills currently in Congress have the potential to exacerbate this 
flight of capital from the mortgage market.121 
 
B. Criticisms from the Public Comment Period 
 
The Agencies received over 100 comments during the public 
comment period from banks, nonbank financial firms, industry groups, 
public officials, public interest groups, and other interested parties.122 
Common themes appeared in the majority of financial industry 
comments.123 Nearly all agreed that the LCR was necessary and a good 
idea in principle.124 However, those same commenters found the U.S. 
LCR far too strict and preferred a standard more similar to the Basel III 
LCR.125 In particular, financial institutions criticized the exclusion of 
high-quality private label MBS and municipal securities from HQLA.126 
Many commenters expressed concern that excluding these assets 
from the definition of HQLA would disrupt markets and harm 
consumers, as well as state and local  governments.127  These 
commenters fear that exclusion would sap demand for municipal 
securities which, in turn, would lead to increased borrowing costs for 
municipalities, harming local economies and hindering infrastructure 
investments.128 
Commenters expressed similar concerns with regard to private 
label MBS. They feared that excluding private label MBS from HQLA 
would cause a shortage in demand for MBS, which they feared would 
lead to decreased funding for mortgages and  increased borrowing costs 
 
121. See infra Part V. 
122. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 
61440, 61442 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329). 
123. See DAN RYAN ET AL., PWC FIN. SERVS. REGULATORY PRACTICE, 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, A CLOSER LOOK: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO: NO BLOOD, 
BUT SWEAT AND TEARS (Apr. 2014), http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/financial- 
services/regulatory-services/publications/assets/us-liquidity-coverage-ratio.pdf  (providing 
an aggregate analysis of all the major issues raised during the public comment period). 
124. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul Ackerman, supra note 91. 
125. Comment Letter from 14 Regional Banks, supra note 109. 
126. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Paul Ackerman, supra note 91. 
127. Id. 
128. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61443. 
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for consumers.129 In the view of many commenters, providing a way to 
include highly-rated private label MBS in the definition of HQLA  
would facilitate a return of private capital to the secondary mortgage 
market and mitigate any impacts on mortgage rates for consumers.130 
IV. INTERPLAY BETWEEN HOUSING FINANCE REFORM AND LCR 
 
President Obama signed Dodd-Frank into law on July 21, 
2010,131 nearly two years after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac  were 
placed into government conservatorship.132 Despite the nearly $190 
billion provided by the U.S. Treasury to the GSEs as part of their 
bailout133 and its sweeping 848 pages of financial regulation, Dodd- 
Frank left unanswered the question of what to do with the GSEs and 
how to reshape the U.S. housing finance system.134 Section 1074 of 
Dodd-Frank directed the Secretary of the Treasury to “conduct a  study 
of and develop recommendations regarding the options for ending the 
conservatorship of [Fannie Mae] and [Freddie Mac], while minimizing 
the cost to taxpayers.”135 Although section 1074 deferred any definite 
action on housing finance reform, it provided a timeline for beginning 
the legislative process that was avoided in passing Dodd-Frank.136 It  
also set the substantive agenda for any future housing finance reform 
 
129. Comment Letter from 14 Regional Banks, supra note 109. 
130. Id. 
131. Presidential Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (July 21, 2010). 
132. History of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Conservatorships, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Conservatorship/Pages/History-of-Fannie-Mae—Freddie- 
Conservatorships.aspx (last accessed Oct. 9, 2014). 
133. Id. 
134. Action on the future of the GSEs was deferred despite an explicit Congressional 
finding in Dodd-Frank that GSE reform was important and the conservatorship arrangement 
was unsustainable. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd- 
Frank) § 1491, 124 Stat. 1376, 2205–06 (2010). 
135. Dodd-Frank § 1074, 124 Stat. at 2067. The study, “Reforming America’s Housing 
Finance Market,” was released jointly by the Departments of Treasury and Housing and 
Urban Development on February 11, 2011. The study concluded that Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac should be wound down, the government’s role in the housing market should be 
reduced, and private capital should be encouraged to return to the market. David A. Luigs, 
Whither Fannie and Freddie? Reform of the U.S. Secondary Mortgage Market, 5 FIN. INST. 
REP. (Debevoise & Plimpton) No. 3, at 6, 7–9 (Mar. 2011). 
136. See Dodd-Frank § 1074(b), 124 Stat. at 2068 (mandating the Secretary of the 
Treasury provide a study on ending Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s conservatorship to both 
the Senate Banking Committee and House Financial Services Committee by January 31, 
2011). 
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legislation by requiring the Treasury Secretary’s report to address a 
wide range of options for the GSEs including wholesale liquidation, 
privatization, incorporation into a Federal agency, as well as any other 
options the Treasury Secretary deemed viable.137 
Several bills currently debated in Congress address the issues of 
housing finance reform and the future of the GSEs, which Dodd-Frank 
left unresolved. While each of these bills approaches the issue 
differently, their proposals parallel the options identified in § 1074 of 
Dodd-Frank.138 The legislative proposals currently before Congress 
range from complete privatization of the mortgage market139 to a public- 
private hybrid mortgage market.140 Despite two separate bills passing 
committee—one by the Senate Banking Committee141 and one by the 
House Financial Services Committee142—each proposal only represents 
a first step and significant alterations and compromises will  be 
necessary to gain enough support to pass both chambers of Congress.143 
Furthermore, there is little indication that Congress will make 
any meaningful progress toward passing housing finance reform 
legislation even with the Republican Party now in control of both 
chambers after the 2014 midterm elections.144    While some members of 
 
 
137.    Dodd-Frank § 1074, 124 Stat. at 2067–68. 
138. See infra Part IV.A. 
139. For a discussion of the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 
2013 (“PATH”), see infra Part IV.A.2. 
140. For a discussion of the Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 
2014 (“Johnson-Crapo”), see infra Part IV.A.1 
141. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, Senate 
Banking Committee (May 15, 2014), 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.MinorityNews& 
ContentRecord_id=073129bb-cc29-7915-58af- 
6ebdf149c1a2&Region_id=&Issue_id=&IsPrint=1 [hereinafter Senate Banking Committee]. 
142. Press Release, U.S. House of Rep. Comm. on Fin. Servs., PATH Act Passes 
Committee (July 24, 2013), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=343722 
[hereinafter PATH Act Passes Committee]. 
143. See Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2013: Hearing on S. 
1217 Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (May 15, 2014) 
(statement of Sen. Tim Johnson, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs) 
(“[Johnson-Crapo] is not the final product. This is only the first step toward real reform, and 
we will continue to work together to improve the bill and attract additional support.”). 
144. See Christopher Whalen, What Republicans’ Election Win Means for Housing 
Reform, AM. BANKER (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/what- 
republicans-election-win-means-for-housing-reform-1071186-1.html (detailing several 
obstacles to passing housing finance reform despite Republican majority control of 
Congress). 
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Congress are optimistic that housing finance reform legislation could 
pass in 2015,145 some industry analysts are doubtful that Congress will 
take up the issue before the 2016 presidential election, if it takes up the 
issue at all.146 Even those optimistic about the prospects of housing 
finance reform legislation concede that the current stability in the 
housing market and profitability of the GSEs—profits which flow 
directly to the U.S. Treasury—pose a significant impediment to any 
action on reform.147 While any sustainable long-term reform of the 
GSEs requires comprehensive Congressional action,148 the ultimate 
design of the reform, in particular the extent of the government’s 
involvement in the mortgage market,149  remains undetermined.150 
Due to the varying provisions of the proposed legislation 
currently before Congress, the future of the housing finance system will 
look very different depending on which version ultimately becomes 
law.151     In  particular, MBS will take on  different  characteristics  from 
 
 
 
145. See Victoria Finkle, Maryland Congressman Hopeful for GSE Reform Resurgence, 
AM. BANKER (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_184/maryland- 
congressman-hopeful-for-gse-reform-resurgence-1070166-1.html (reporting on a housing 
reform bill introduced by three congressmen and co-sponsored by another twelve); see also 
Daniel Newhauser, Can Jeb Hensarling Learn to Compromise?, NAT’L J. DAILY (Sept. 23, 
2014), http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/can-jeb-hensarling-learn-to-compromise- 
20140922. 
146. See BEN LANE, LOOKS LIKE GSE REFORM TALKS WILL STRETCH INTO 2017, AT 
LEAST,  HOUSINGWIRE REWIRED BLOG  (Apr. 30,  2014), 
http://www.housingwire.com/blogs/1-rewired/post/29842-looks-like-gse-reform-talks-will- 
stretch-into-2017-at-least; see also Jim Parrott et al., A Johnson-Crapo Dialogue, HOUSING 
FIN. POL’Y CTR. COMMENTARY 10–11  (July  2014),  available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413181-A-Johnson-Crapo-Dialogue.pdf  (quoting 
Laurie Goodman, Housing Finance Policy Center Director, expressing doubt that “we will 
get GSE reform through legislation, at least in my professional life.”). 
147. See Finkle, supra note 145 (“[T]he status quo is difficult to overcome in part 
because the government is generating huge profits from the GSEs, which remain in 
conservatorship.”). 
148. See JIM PARROTT, URBAN INST., HOUSING FINANCE POLICY CENTER COMMENTARY: 
WHY LONG-TERM GSE REFORM REQUIRES CONGRESS 1 (May 22, 2014), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413128-Why-Long-Term-GSE-Reform-Requires- 
Congress.pdf. However, there is by no means consensus that housing reform legislation 
should be passed. See Nick Timiraos, Investor Fires Salvo Against Fannie, Freddie, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 3, 2014, at A5 (noting shareholders, including prominent institutional investors, 
support leaving the GSEs intact as private, standalone enterprises). 
149. See Finkle, supra note 145. 
150. MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, HOUSING REFORM STEPS 
FORWARD 7 (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2014-03- 
25-Housing-Finance-Reform-Steps-Forward.pdf. 
151. Id. 
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those issued under the current housing finance system.152 For these 
reasons, an overview of the key provisions of each proposed bill will aid 
in the discussion of the future status of MBS in a reformed housing 
finance system. 
 
A. Current Legislative Proposals 
 
1. The Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014 
The Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee 
approved a housing finance reform bill sponsored by Committee Chair 
Sen. Tim Johnson (D-SD) and Ranking Member Sen. Mike Crapo (R- 
ID) on May 15, 2014.153 This piece of legislation, the Housing Finance 
Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of  2014  (“Johnson-Crapo”),154 
was originally introduced by Sens. Bob Corker (R-TN) and Mark 
Warner (D-VA).155 Johnson-Crapo is the second iteration of the Corker-
Warner bill,156 having been amended to incorporate the findings from a 
series of hearings held during the fall and winter of 2013 after the 
Corker-Warner bill was introduced.157 The purpose  of  the committee 
hearings was to “explor[e] essential elements necessary for reform” and 
in so doing, gather bipartisan input and support for a bill with a realistic 
chance of passing the full Congress and being signed  into law.158 
Johnson-Crapo remains consistent with the original Corker- Warner  
bill,159   which  served  as  the  “base  text”  and  whose “overall 
 
152. See infra Part IV.B. 
153. Senate Banking Committee, supra note 141. 
154. Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th 
Cong. § 101 (2014). 
155. Senate Banking Committee, supra note 141. 
156. Id. 
157. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, Johnson, 
Crapo Announce Agreement on Housing Finance Reform (Mar. 11, 2014) [hereinafter 
Johnson, Crapo Announce Agreement on Housing Finance Reform], 
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Newsroom.PressReleases&C 
ontentRecord_id=ef6c85f2-9ba5-ccf0-6a01-1d83fcf2f502&Region_id=&Issue_id=. 
158. Id. 
159. Corker-Warner, also S. 1217, was a bipartisan housing finance reform bill  
originally introduced to the Senate on June 25, 2013. See MARK ZANDI & CRISTIAN DERITIS, 
MOODY’S ANALYTICS, EVALUATING CORKER-WARNER 1 (July 8, 2013), available at 
https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2013-07-08-Evaluating-Corker- 
Warner.pdf. 
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architecture” was maintained.160 
Among the competing housing finance reform proposals, 
Johnson-Crapo likely holds the most promise of serving as the 
foundation for any reform that eventually succeeds in passing the full 
Congress.161 The Senate Banking Committee received praise for its 
careful and methodical consideration of the multitude of issues raised  
by legislation of this complexity during the hearing process.162 Johnson-
Crapo also has the backing of the Obama administration, although this 
was not enough to secure the votes of six holdout Democrats on the 
committee.163 While Johnson-Crapo is currently the most viable 
proposal, it still suffers from a lack of support among both Democrats, 
who are concerned with its effects on affordable housing, and 
Republicans, who criticize the size of the government’s role under the 
bill.164 
The change in committee leadership after the 2014 midterm 
elections will likely cause significant headwinds for Johnson-Crapo. 
Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) is in line to serve as the next chairman of 
the Banking Committee with Sen. Sherrod Brown (D-OH) the presumed 
ranking Democrat.165 Significantly, both senators voted against Johnson-
Crapo during the full committee vote in May 2014.166 As a result of the 
leadership change, the Republican-controlled Senate Banking 
Committee will focus on either drafting a new bill or amending 
 
 
160. Johnson, Crapo Announce Agreement on Housing Finance Reform, supra note  
141; see also ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 150, at 1. 
161. Nick Timiraos, Fannie-Freddie Overhaul Hits Snag: Thin Democratic Support, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2014, at A5. The Senate Banking Committee approved Johnson-Crapo 
on a 13-9 vote with seven Republicans and six Democrats in favor, whereas the competing 
House bill received no support from Democrats.). Although bipartisan support for Johnson- 
Crapo was met with bipartisan dissent, the competing House PATH bill passed a committee 
vote with only Republican support.  See Finkle, supra note 145. 
162. Mel Martinez & George Mitchell, Johnson-Crapo Proposal Keeps Hope Alive for 
Housing Finance Reform,     BIPARTISAN    POL’Y     CTR. BLOG (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/housing/2014/04/23/johnson-crapo-proposal-keeps-hope- 
alive-housing-finance-reform. 
163. Jon Prior & MJ Lee, Senate Banking Approves Bill to End Fannie Mae, Freddie 
Mac, POLITICO (May 15, 2014, 11:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/senate- 
banking-committee-fannie-freddie-vote-end-106719.html. 
164. Id. 
165. Victoria Finkle, How Shelby Will Guide the Banking Committee Again, AM. 
BANKER (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/179_213/how-shelby-will- 
guide-the-banking-committee-194151-again-1071052-1.html. 
166. Id.; Timiraos, supra note 161. 
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Johnson-Crapo.167 
Johnson-Crapo mandates Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to wind 
up  and  revokes their charters.168 Johnson-Crapo  also  creates a new 
federal agency called the Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation 
(“FMIC”) to regulate the mortgage finance market.169 The FMIC would 
be an independent regulator modeled after the FDIC serving a dual role 
as  both  MBS  insurer  and  rule  maker.170 In  addition  to  these  key 
provisions, Johnson-Crapo calls for private capital to take the first-loss 
position ahead of FMIC insurance; that is, private actors will absorb 
losses on FMIC-backed securities up to a specified percentage of the 
principal of the MBS before the FMIC is required to cover any losses.171 
As an MBS insurer, the FMIC would first be charged with establishing 
a common securitization platform organized as a member- owned 
utility.172 Investors  in  new  securitizations  from the platform 
would receive an explicit government guarantee of timely payment of 
principal and interest from the FMIC.173 However, the FMIC guarantee 
would only be implicated when the private capital buffer required by the 
statute is exhausted.174 Johnson-Crapo requires private market actors to 
take a first-loss position of “not less than 10 percent of the principal or 
face value of the single-family covered security at the time of 
issuance.”175 Therefore,  the  FMIC  offers  an  explicit,  but  limited, 
government  guarantee. The   FMIC   would   provide this  guarantee 
through a newly-created Mortgage Insurance Fund, which would be 
financed by fees assessed on securitizations and backed by the full faith 
and credit of the U.S. Treasury.176 
As a rulemaking regulator, the FMIC would be charged with 
 
 
167. Finkle, supra note 165. 
168. Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th 
Cong. § 101 (2014). 
169.    Id. § 201. 
170.   ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 150, at 1. 
171.    S. 1217 § 302. 
172.    Id. § 321. 
173.    Id. § 303. 
174.    Id. § 302. 
175. Id. The statute allows the private capital first-loss position to take the form of an 
approved bond guarantor providing insurance or a capital markets transaction to absorb 
credit losses.  For a detailed explanation of the credit-sharing methods in Johnson-Crapo,  
see SEAN HOSKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL7-5700, EXPLANATION AND ILLUSTRATION 
OF THE JOHNSON-CRAPO GSE REFORM PROPOSAL 8 (Apr. 7, 2014). 
176.    S. 1217 § 303. 
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creating “securitization standards and underwriting requirements in  
loans that make up securities backed by the government.”177 FMIC- 
backed securities would only be comprised of mortgage loans meeting 
certain underwriting standards.178 Johnson-Crapo directs the FMIC to 
conform its underwriting standards for single-family mortgage loans  
that are eligible for an FMIC guarantee to the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau’s Qualified Mortgage rule.179 In addition, the rule 
requires a minimum down payment of 3.5% for first-time homebuyers 
and 5% for non-first-time homebuyers.180 Taken together, the explicit 
government backstop, private capital buffer, uniform underwriting 
standards, as well as many other provisions not discussed here, are 
intended to “provide[] certainty to investors and homeowners through 
standardization and improved market liquidity.”181 
Johnson-Crapo establishes a “Small Lender Mutual,” an 
additional provision to increase liquidity.182 The entity would seek to 
ensure small lenders have access to the secondary mortgage market by 
purchasing and aggregating eligible loans from these lenders for 
securitization.183 
Johnson-Crapo appears to be the leading prospect for housing 
finance reform legislation.184 However, its hybrid public-private 
approach contrasts with the proposed legislation approved by the House 
Financial  Services  Committee,  which  calls  for  the  near  complete 
 
 
177. Victoria Finkle & Donna Borak, Cheat Sheet: Details from the Johnson-Crapo  
GSE Bill, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014), 
http://www.nationalmortgagenews.com/news/origination/cheat-sheet-details-from-the- 
johnson-crapo-gse-bill-1041363-1.html. 
178. S. 1217 § 2(29)(A) (defining “eligible single-family mortgage loan”). 
179. Id. § 2(29)(A)(i)(II). The CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage rule, codified at 12 C.F.R. § 
1026 (2013), requires borrowers to have a debt-to-income ratio of less than 43%, prohibits 
lenders charging excessive fees and points, and also prohibits lenders from underwriting 
mortgage loans with high-risk features like interest-only payments, negative amortization, 
and balloon payments. 
180.    S. 1217 § 2(29)(A). 
181. Senate Banking Committee, supra note 141. 
182. S. 1217 § 315. Insured depository institutions with less than $500 billion in total 
assets and non-depository mortgage originators with a minimum net worth of $2.5 million 
and less than $100 billion in annual mortgage loan production are eligible to participate in 
the Small Lender Mutual.  § 315(e). 
183. See id. § 315(b) (describing the purpose of the “Small Lender Mutual”). 
184. See Prior & Lee, supra note 163 (stating Johnson-Crapo has bipartisan support in 
the Senate and support from the White House although it also suffers from bipartisan 
opposition in the Senate). 
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privatization of the mortgage finance system.185 
 
 
2. Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R. 
2767 
 
On July 24, 2013, the House Financial Services Committee 
passed the Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 
2013 (“PATH”).186 Twelve fact-finding hearings, most of which 
centered on the themes of failed government regulation and how best to 
create a sustainable private mortgage finance market, produced 
PATH.187 Significantly, no Democrats on the Republican-led Financial 
Services Committee voted for the proposal.188  However,  the  
Republican committee majority led by its chairman, Rep. Jeb  
Hensarling (R-TX), was sufficient to move PATH forward despite 
Democratic opposition and two Republican committee members also 
voting against the measure.189 
Neither Johnson-Crapo190 nor PATH managed to enlist the 
support necessary for a vote on the floors of their  respective 
chambers.191 As previously noted, PATH did not attract the vote of a 
single Democrat, whereas Johnson-Crapo garnered bipartisan  
support.192 Furthermore, PATH attracted negative responses from 
outside Congress including being labeled an “unviable proposal” by 
Moody’s  Chief  Economist  Mark  Zandi.193       PATH,  however,  is not 
 
185. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
186. PATH Act Passes Committee, supra note 141. 
187. Fact Finding: 11 Hearings on Sustainable Housing Finance Reforms in 2013, THE 
COMMITTEE ON FIN.         SERVICES BLOG (July          17,          2013), 
http://financialservices.house.gov/blog/?postid=341681. 
188. Finkle, supra note 145. 
189. Cheyenne Hopkins, House Committee Approves Hensarling’s Housing-Finance 
Bill, BLOOMBERG (July 24, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013-07- 
24/house-committee-approves-hensarling-s-housing-finance-overhaul.html. 
190. Trey Garrison, Barclays: 4 Reasons Johnson-Crapo Is Dead Until Post-Election; 
Plus One Reason It May Be Dead After That, HOUSINGWIRE (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/print/29519-barclays-4-reasons-johnson-crapo-is- 
dead-until-post-election. 
191. See Newhauser, supra note 145 (“[PATH] passed the committee, but went no 
further as leadership made the calculation that the legislation could not pass the full 
House.”). 
192. Michael Shaw & Kate Ackley, Senate Panel Approves Housing Finance Overhaul, 
CQ ROLL CALL (May 15, 2014). 
193. MARK  ZANDI  & CRIS  DERITIS, MOODY’S  ANALYTICS, EVALUATING  PATH 1 (July 
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without its free market industry supporters.194 
PATH has three overarching planks: (1) eliminate Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, (2) revamp the Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”), and (3) “privatize the rest of the housing finance system.”195 
The GSEs’ charters would be repealed after five years196 during which 
time they would slowly be forced to transition out of the market by 
raising fees charged to guarantee timely payment of principal and 
interest on the MBS they securitize,197 decreasing conforming loan 
limits,198 and limiting their purchases to only qualified mortgage  
(“QM”) loans.199 Interestingly, with the exception of the conforming 
loan limits, Fannie and Freddie are already taking these steps.200 
In addition to these reforms, PATH would restrict the mortgages 
and consumers that the FHA can serve201 and require the FHA “to  
reduce its insurance coverage on mortgage loans from the current 100% 
to 50%, while sharing the risk with private investors.”202 According to 
Mark Zandi, Moody’s Chief Economist, under the PATH regime “the 
FHA would account for no more than one-fifth of the mortgage market 
on average” with private mortgage loans with no government support 
accounting for the remaining four-fifths of the mortgage market.203 
PATH envisions privatizing the mortgage market by  
establishing a not-for-profit, non-governmental national mortgage 
market utility to operate a common securitization platform for 
residential   MBS   and   “develop   standards   related   to   originating, 
 
17, 2013), https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/2013-07-17-Evaluating- 
PATH.pdf. 
194. JASON FREDERICK & NATHANIEL KARP, BBVA RESEARCH ECON. WATCH, THE 
FUTURE OF FINANCING AMERICA’S HOMES: AN EXPANDED PRIVATE SECTOR ROLE CAN 
REDUCE SYSTEMIC RISK 15 (May 27, 2014), available at https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp- 
content/uploads/2014/05/140524_EconomicWatchEEUU_2281.pdf (“Of all the current 
reform proposals, the PATH Act moves the system closer to an ideal in which private 
entities operate a Common Securitization Platform and participate in the origination and 
guarantee of mortgage-backed securities.”). 
195. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1. 
196. Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R. 2767, 113th 
Cong. § 110 (2013). 
197. Id. § 104; ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1. 
198. H.R. 2767 § 105; ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1 
199. H.R. 2767 § 107; see Truth in Lending Act (TILA) § 129C(b), 15 U.S.C. 1639c(b) 
(2012) (defining QM loans). 
200. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1. 
201.    H.R. 2767 § 232. 
202. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1. 
203. Id. at 2. 
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servicing, pooling, and securitizing residential mortgage loans.”204 
PATH would also clear the way for covered bonds to provide an 
additional source of funding for the mortgage market.205 Unlike 
securitizations, where the mortgage loans backing the MBS are sold, 
covered bonds are backed by pooled loans that the issuing bank retains 
on its balance sheet.206  The virtue of this risk retention is the incentive  
it provides to covered bond issuers to “maintain high origination 
standards” which “tends to align the interests of the banks and  
regulators in a way that securitisation never will.”207 Although covered 
bonds are common in Europe, no significant covered bond market exists 
in the United States due to the lack of enabling legislation or regulatory 
guidance such as that proposed by PATH.208 
Enabling a covered bond market in the United States would aid 
in PATH’s goal of attracting more private financing to the mortgage 
market.209 However, there are various regulatory impediments  to  
issuing covered bonds in the United States including lack of incentives 
due to regulations like the LCR, which does not classify covered bonds 
as HQLA.210 
Some industry commentators are critical of PATH,  asserting 
that any advantages it might offer are outweighed by higher costs and 
reduced access to mortgage financing.211 Nonetheless, proponents of 
PATH refute these claims and assert that PATH would actually make 
mortgage financing more affordable than under the current law.212 
 
3. The Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014 (H.R. 
5055) 
 
Reps.  John  Delaney (D-MD),  John  Carney,  (D-DE),  and Jim 
 
204.    H.R. 2767 § 312. 
205.    § 353. 
206. Anna T. Pinedo & Jerry R. Marlatt, Seizing the Opportunity, Int’l Fin. L. Rev., 
July/Aug. 2014, at 64. 
207. Id. 
208. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 2. 
209. See Pinedo & Marlatt, supra note 206 (advocating for the regulatory changes to 
increase the use of covered bonds as part of a diversity of private funding for the U.S. 
mortgage market). 
210. Id. 
211. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 3 (Adopting PATH “would drive mortgage 
rates nearly 90 basis points higher than they currently are.”). 
212. PATH Act Passes Committee, supra note 142. 
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Himes (D-CT) introduced the Partnership to Strengthen 
Homeownership Act to the House on July 10, 2014.213 The proposed  
bill has been referred to the House Financial Services Committee for 
consideration214 and Representative Delaney hopes it will be considered 
in 2015.215 Unlike PATH, this third alternative for housing finance 
reform legislation seeks to maintain government involvement in the 
housing market by establishing an insurance program through Ginnie 
Mae.216 
The Delaney bill envisions a public-private hybrid housing 
finance system similar to Johnson-Crapo.217 Unlike Johnson-Crapo’s 
10% private capital buffer, however, the Delaney bill only calls for 
private capital to take a 5% first-loss position on insured MBS.218  
Ginnie Mae and a private reinsurer would share the exposure to the 
remaining 95% of the guaranteed principal amount.219 Ginnie Mae’s 
portion of the insurance would be backed by the full faith and credit of 
the U.S. government, giving these MBS a semi-government 
guarantee.220 Similar to both Johnson-Crapo and PATH, the Delaney  
bill would also revoke Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s charters.221 
 
B. Treatment of Mortgage-Backed Securities After GSE Reform 
 
Given the recent adoption of the final LCR rule, passage of a 
housing   finance   reform   bill   into   law   may   complicate   financial 
 
213. Press Release, Office of Rep. John Delaney, Delaney, Carney, and Himes  
Introduce Housing Finance Reform Legislation (July 10, 2014), 
http://delaney.house.gov/news/press-releases/delaney-carney-and-himes-introduce-housing- 
finance-reform-legislation. 
214. Press Release, Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., New Housing Finance Reform 
Measure Introduced in House, Funding for NHTF Included (July 11, 2014), available at 
http://nlihc.org/article/new-housing-finance-reform-measure-introduced-house-funding- 
nhtf-included. 
215. Finkle, supra note 145. 
216. Delaney, Carney, and Himes Introduce Housing Finance Reform Legislation, supra 
note 212. 
217. Finkle, supra note 145. 
218. Id. 
219. Jacob Gaffney & Ben Lane, New Legislation Will Break  Apart and Sell Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac; House Democrats Introduce New GSE Reform Measure, 
HOUSINGWIRE (July 10, 2014), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/30607-new- 
legislation-will-break-apart-and-sell-fannie-mae-and-freddie-mac. 
220. Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014, H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. § 
202 (2014). 
221.   Id. § 305. 
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institutions’ efforts to comply with the LCR. The issue centers on the 
LCR’s classification of MBS for HQLA purposes. The LCR’s 
classification of GSE MBS as Level 2A imposes a capital haircut and 
portfolio composition caps on these assets.222 These restrictions make 
GSE MBS less attractive as a means of complying with the LCR than 
Level 1 assets223 such as cash, U.S. Treasury securities, and Ginnie Mae 
MBS.224 The Agencies noted that as a government  agency  Ginnie 
Mae’s obligations are explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit  
of the U.S. government,225 whereas the Agencies designated GSE MBS 
Level 2A assets because they are not explicitly guaranteed by the  
federal government.226 In contrast, private label MBS, even AAA rated 
private label MBS, do not qualify as HQLA and, therefore, do not count 
towards compliance with the LCR.227 
The Agencies adopted the LCR in a world where Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, under government conservatorship but nonetheless 
without an explicit government guarantee, issue nearly all MBS.228 The 
three leading housing finance reform proposals, however, all call for the 
elimination of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.229 Based on the  
distinctions drawn in the LCR between MBS with an explicit 
government guarantee (Ginnie Mae MBS) and those without such a 
guarantee (GSE MBS and private label MBS), the passage of any 
housing finance reform legislation requires an assessment of how 
newly-issued MBS will be classified under a new regime for LCR 
purposes. 
The  PATH  Act  provides  the  most  cut-and-dried  example  of 
 
222. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. 
61440, 61529–30 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329). 
223. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 68, at 5 (“[S]ome categories 
of assets, such as non-investment-grade corporate debt securities and private label 
residential mortgage-backed securities, will have no value for purposes of U.S. liquidity 
requirements.”). 
224. Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79 Fed. Reg. at 
61529. 
225.    Id. at 61456. 
226. Id. at 61458 (noting that while the GSEs are under conservatorship they are 
effectively guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, but not explicitly). 
227. See SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 68, at 1. 
228. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, supra note 14. 
229. Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th 
Cong. § 101 (2014); Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeowners Act of 2013, H.R. 
2767, 113th Cong. § 110 (2013); Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014, 
H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. § 103 (2014). 
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housing finance reform legislation that does not address the conflict it 
creates with the LCR’s HQLA definitions.230 Given that  nearly the 
entire mortgage finance market would be privatized under PATH,231 it  
is safe to say that MBS issued by the national mortgage market utility’s 
platform would be designated as private label MBS for purposes of the 
LCR.232 Under this system, the only MBS that would qualify as HQLA 
would be those issued by Ginnie Mae which would still receive a Level 
1 designation.233 
The public-private hybrid mortgage finance systems proposed  
by Johnson-Crapo and the Delaney bill are not so black and white. 
Under Johnson-Crapo, FMIC-backed MBS would come with a full faith 
and credit guarantee.234 However, the 10% private capital first-loss 
position suggests that these securities might be designated as private 
label considering Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and private mortgage 
insurers collectively lost less than half that amount as a result of the 
2008 financial crisis.235 A private capital level that high would “all but 
eliminat[e] taxpayers’ exposure to risk” because the 2008  financial 
crisis and housing crash resulted in losses less than half that amount.236 
Furthermore, the FMIC guarantee could more accurately be called a 
limited guarantee given the first-loss position of private capital and the 
high unlikelihood that the full faith and credit guarantee would ever be 
drawn upon.237 Although the Agencies would probably characterize 
FMIC-backed securities as having an explicit government  guarantee 
and, therefore, Level 1 HQLA, at least one industry group sees enough 
doubt in such a future classification that it proposed changing Johnson- 
 
230.    See H.R. 2767 § 110 et seq. 
231. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 193, at 1. 
232. See Liquidity Coverage Ratio: Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards, 79  Fed. 
Reg. 61440, 61529 (Oct. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 50, 249 & 329) (defining 
HQLA). 
233. See id. (defining “[a] security that is issued by, or unconditionally guaranteed as to 
the timely payment of principal and interest by, a U.S. government agency . . . whose 
obligations are fully and explicitly guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. 
government” as a Level 1 asset); see also GINNIE MAE, supra note 103 (stating that Ginnie 
Mae is a “wholly-owned government corporation within the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD)” that issues MBS explicitly guaranteed by the U.S. 
government). 
234.    S. 1217 § 303(d)(9). 
235. ZANDI & DERITIS, supra note 150, at 2 (stating that a 10% private capital buffer 
would “all but eliminat[e] taxpayers’ exposure to risk”). 
236. Id. 
237. Martinez & Mitchell, supra note 162. 
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Crapo’s text to classify such securities as Level 1 HQLA.238 
The housing finance system called for by the Delaney bill  
makes a stronger case for having an explicit government guarantee. 
MBS issued under that bill’s Ginnie Mae public-private insurance 
sharing scheme would have an explicit government guarantee for 95%  
of the MBS face value—the portion that Ginnie Mae would be 
responsible for insuring.239 Under this proposal, the private capital first- 
loss position is only 5%240 compared with 10% under Johnson-Crapo.241 
However, whether MBS issued under the Delaney legislative regime 
would qualify as HQLA under the LCR is uncertain without further 
regulatory or legislative guidance. 
The adoption of the final LCR rule and the various housing 
finance reform legislative proposals currently before Congress raise the 
question of whether MBS in the future will be treated more like Level 1 
Ginnie Mae MBS or more like private label MBS. Whether or to what 
degree MBS qualify as HQLA after housing finance reform has 
significant implications for the housing market because the LCR 
provides an incentive for financial institutions to prefer HQLA over 
non-HQLA like private label MBS.242 If housing finance reform 
legislation creates a system where the vast majority of MBS are defined 
as private label non-HQLA, then financial institutions will have less 
incentive to hold these assets on their balance sheets.243 
V. MAINTAINING CAPITAL IN THE HOUSING MARKET AFTER HOUSING 
FINANCE REFORM 
 
The current housing finance system needs to be reformed.244   
The status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as wards of the state is 
 
 
238. STRUCTURED FIN. INDUS. GRP., JOHNSON-CRAPO BRIEFING BOOK 15 (Apr.  21, 
2014), available at http://www.sfindustry.org/images/uploads/pdfs/Johnson- 
Crapo%20Briefing%20Book.pdf. 
239. Partnership to Strengthen Homeownership Act of 2014, H.R. 5055, 113th Cong. § 
202 (2014). 
240. Id. 
241. Finkle & Borak, supra note 177. 
242. See, e.g., Comment Letter from Christopher B. Killian, supra note 18, at 10. 
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unsustainable,245 but any meaningful GSE reform requires 
comprehensive action by Congress.246 The need for reform  is made  
even stronger by the importance of the housing market to the U.S. 
economy.247 However, all housing finance reform plans will raise 
mortgage rates and negatively impact the housing market and the 
national economy.248 For this reason, it is critical that any reform 
legislation minimizes the costs to the housing market and maintains 
adequate capital in the secondary mortgage market. 
The exclusion of private label MBS from HQLA in the final 
LCR rule may decrease liquidity in the secondary mortgage market as 
financial institutions shift their capital to other assets.249 Under the 
current housing finance system, the Agencies found that excluding 
private label MBS would not cause any liquidity issues because 
financial institutions would not be deterred from investing in these 
securities despite the regulatory disincentives.250 However, the passage 
of housing finance reform legislation combined with the final LCR 
definitions of HQLA may create a significant deterrent effect resulting 
in an unintended capital shortage in the secondary mortgage market.251 
During the public comment period for the LCR, nearly every 
financial institution expressed their concern that the classification of 
GSE MBS as Level 2A assets and the exclusion of private label 
mortgage-backed securities would shift banks’ balance sheets away 
from these assets.252 Such a shift in assets, they argued, would decrease 
the funding available for mortgages and raise mortgage interest rates, 
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thereby making it much more difficult and expensive for consumers to 
obtain mortgage financing.253 
This problem of shifting capital away from GSE and private 
label MBS to more liquid assets would only be exacerbated by housing 
finance legislation that eliminates the GSEs without replacing them with 
an entity to issue MBS with comparable HQLA treatment or providing a 
means for  private label MBS  to  qualify  as HQLA.254 Under a fully 
privatized mortgage finance market like the one called for by PATH, all 
MBS would be private label MBS255 and, therefore, excluded from 
HQLA.256 In such a system, banks would have less incentive to hold 
MBS  on  their  balance  sheets.257 The  secondary  mortgage  markets 
would feel the pinch as banks sell off their existing MBS holdings and 
redirect capital into other assets that qualify for inclusion in the LCR.258 
A shift by financial institutions away from investment in mortgage 
securities would be economically significant. U.S. depository 
institutions hold $951.4 billion worth of GSE MBS, $136.6 billion 
worth of private label MBS, as well as $193.4 billion worth of GSE 
debt.259 In comparison, U.S. depository institutions only hold $345.5 
billion worth of U.S. Treasury securities.260 Housing reform proposals 
that eliminate GSE MBS could unintentionally cause banks to reallocate 
their MBS holdings to Level 1 assets like U.S. Treasuries.261 Such a 
move   would   have   profound   ripple   effects   throughout   the  entire 
economy beyond the impacts felt in the housing market.262 
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For these reasons, passage of any housing finance reform 
legislation must take into account the necessity of a robust MBS market. 
If Congress ultimately moves forward with a system similar to those 
proposed by Johnson-Crapo and the Delaney bill, the drafters of the 
legislation would be prudent to include a provision that specifically 
deals with the LCR. The Structured Finance Industry Group proposed a 
clause be included in Johnson-Crapo mandating that FMIC-backed 
securities qualify as Level 1 HQLA for purposes of the LCR.263 The 
Agencies could also accomplish the same result through new  
rulemaking in response to housing finance reform legislation. 
A housing finance reform proposal creating a privatized 
mortgage system similar to PATH would require a different solution as 
there would be no explicit government-guaranteed MBS like under 
Johnson-Crapo.264 However, the Agencies or Congress could leverage 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Qualified Mortgage rule265 
as well as independent credit ratings to create a class of high-quality 
MBS with sufficient liquidity to warrant classification as HQLA. 
The final LCR rule and current proposals for housing finance 
reform legislation create the potential for an unintended shift of capital 
out of the secondary mortgage market.266  This potential shift would be  
a response to the regulatory incentives in the LCR for financial 
institutions to hold assets that will help them to comply with the  
LCR.267 Congress and federal  banking regulators should be  conscious 
of the potential for a liquidity pinch in the secondary mortgage market  
as they draft housing finance reform legislation and its accompanying 
regulations. 
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